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Mary Sarah Bilder  
Why We Have Judicial Review 
Judicial review in the United States is controversial largely because, as 
Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry explain, there exists among the public “a 
sense of innate conflict between democracy and judicial review.”1 The standard 
account of judicial review, which describes the practice as invented by Chief 
Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison,2 only contributes to that sense of 
concern. The origins of judicial review, however, do not lie in judicial creativity 
or even in the history of judicial power, but, as my Yale Law Journal article 
demonstrates,3 in the commitment to limited legislative authority. Not until 
1910 did “judicial review” become the popular label for the judiciary’s practice 
of invalidating legislation contrary to the Constitution. For decades after the 
Founding, what we think of as “judicial review” was described not as judicial 
lawmaking, but rather as the practice of voiding legislation repugnant to the 
Constitution. 
The generation that framed the Constitution presumed that courts would 
declare void legislation that was repugnant or contrary to the Constitution. 
They held this presumption because of colonial American practice. By the early 
seventeenth century, English law subjected the by-laws of corporations to the 
requirement that they not be repugnant to the laws of the nation. The early 
English settlements in Virginia and Massachusetts were originally corporations 
and so these settlements were bound by the principle that colonial legislation 
could not be repugnant to the laws of England. Under this standard, colonial 
lawyers appealed approximately 250 cases from colonial courts to the English 
Privy Council, and the Crown reviewed over 8500 colonial acts. 
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After the American Revolution, this practice continued. State court judges 
voided state legislation inconsistent with their respective state constitutions. 
The Framers of the Constitution similarly presumed that judges would void 
legislation repugnant to the United States Constitution. Although a few 
Framers worried about the power, they expected it would exist. As James 
Madison stated, “A law violating a constitution established by the people 
themselves, would be considered by the Judges as null & void.”4 In fact, the 
word “Constitution” in the Supremacy Clause and the clause describing the 
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction appeared to give textual authorization for judicial 
enforcement of constitutional constraints on state and federal legislation. 
Indeed, before Marbury, Justice Chase observed that although the Court had 
never adjudicated whether the judiciary had the authority to declare laws 
contrary to the Constitution void, this authority was acknowledged by general 
opinion, the entire Supreme Court bar, and some of the Supreme Court 
Justices.5 
By 1803, as Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged in Marbury, “long and 
well established” principles answered “the question, whether an act, repugnant 
to the constitution, can become the law of the land.”6  Marshall concluded that 
“a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts . . . are bound by 
that instrument.”7 As such, contrary to the traditional account of Marbury, 
Marshall’s decision did not conjure judicial review out of thin air, but rather 
affirmed the well-established and long-practiced idea of limited legislative 
authority in the new context of the federal republic of the United States. In 
doing so, Marshall recommitted American constitutional law to a practice over 
four centuries old. 
In turning away from the received assumption that the history of judicial 
review in the United States is a story of the expansion of judicial authority, and 
instead emphasizing the contribution of limited corporate and legislative 
authority, this account suggests new boundaries with respect to what history 
can tell us about the modern practice of judicial review. Because the practice 
presumed by the Founders emphasized the bounded nature of legislation 
limited by the laws of the nation, this history casts doubt on arguments that 
general “natural law” principles were regularly accepted as a legitimate basis for 
review. This history also helps to explain why federal courts embraced review 
 
4.  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 93 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 
1966) (July 23). 
5.  Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14,  19 (1800) (opinion of Chase, J.). 
6.  Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176. 
7.  Id. at 180. 
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of state court decisions relatively easily, while the implications of review of 
congressional legislation were less well contemplated. 
Equally importantly, this perspective suggests that attempts to resolve 
other modern concerns by looking to the history of the Founding era may be 
misguided or meet with great difficulty. The existence of a standard based on 
the word repugnancy—a word that seemed to mean something while remaining 
simultaneously ambiguous—provided a space for early American judges to 
avoid confronting the issue of whether they were engaged in what we would 
call narrow or broad constructions of the Constitution.8 Similarly, because 
judicial review grew out of prior practice rather than an idea or conception of 
separation of powers, it was easy for the Founders to accept the judiciary’s 
power to invalidate legislation that it deemed inconsistent with the 
Constitution without resolving the question of whether the judiciary was the 
ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.9 The belief in a constitutionally 
constrained legislative power coexisted with an aspiration to maintain 
separation of powers, thereby allowing the judiciary of the Founding era to 
skirt the modern issues of judicial supremacy and departmentalism. After the 
ratification of the Constitution, as separation of powers became increasingly 
accepted as the highest constitutional principle, these questions came into 
greater focus. So although the Founding history can serve as a guide for 
resolving some of our modern worries concerning judicial review, we must 
wrestle with others unaided. 
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